COMES NOW, Appellant Marc Perkel, pursuant to Rule 83 and 84.17, to ask the court to ask the court to reconsider en banc or to transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court. In support of this, the Appellant states:

1. The lack of a signature was not an issue before the court in the appeal of Perkel v. Perkel because it was not discovered until after Perkel v. Perkel was decided. Thus the appellant did not know at the time he appealed his divorce that this order was, in fact, unsigned. As the appellant indicated in his brief that he first discovered that the order was unsigned shortly after the Slay v. Slay decision in 1998.
2. The case of State ex rel. York v. Daugherty, 969 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Mo. banc 1998) does not apply to these facts because it relies on the remedy in RSMo 487.030.2 which didn't exist on April 4^th 1995. RSMo 487.030.2 was passed in 1996.
3. The case of State ex rel. York v. Daugherty also only applies to orders signed by commissioners and not orders that are not signed by anyone.
4. The court erred in deciding that the appellant could have appealed the order in that the court's argument presumes that an order existed in the first place. The appellant contends that because the document was unsigned, that it was not an order, and one can not appeal if there is no order to appeal.
5. The opinion in this case expands the narrow exception of estoppel, as applied to otherwise void orders signed by commissioners, to apply to all void orders, including orders that are unsigned. In fact, it eliminates the very definition of a "void" order and makes void orders enforceable. Thus, this opinion is in direct conflict with the opinion in William Blair Hughes And Mary Elizabeth, 332 S.W.2d 1, which determined that a void judgement is a judgement that never really existed and is void forever.
6. The opinion of the court upholds the lower court's decision to dismiss but fails to decide the issues raised by the appellant that an unsigned order from an unknown author is void or valid. The only issue decided here is that the appellant may have improperly raised the issue, leaving the appellant with the burden of starting from scratch and filing a new lawsuit to determine the validity of unsigned orders. This opinion resolves nothing.
7. The opinion of the court is confusing and incomplete in that the opinion applies to orders signed by commissioners and not to orders that are unsigned. The record contains no facts or findings that establish the identity of the author of the unsigned order. The issue of commissioners signing orders is not before this court because a commissioner did not sign the order in question.
8. The Schulte and Tapp decisions apply only to voidable judgements relating to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, which isn't at issue in this case. Thus those decisions, cited by the court, do not apply to the facts of this case.
9. This opinion, which on the surface might be construed to bless an unsigned order as being a legitimate order of the court, is in direct conflict with the plain language of Rule 74.01(a) and Administrative Rule 4.09(6). It also sends a message to all the other judges in Missouri that they no longer have to sign orders of the court and judgements. It is also in direct conflict with a multitude of other decisions that clearly state that order and judgements are required to be "signed by a judge".
10. A judge in this case did not sign this opinion.
11. Neither the opinion nor mandate in Perkel v. Perkel were signed by a judge and thus Perkel v. Perkel remains undecided.
12. Furthermore, it is the custom of this court for orders and judgements to be issued that are not signed by judges. This court is in violation of the plain language of the rules.
13. The order to join these two appeals into one appeal was not signed by a judge.
14. On November 12^th 1999 the appellant complained about the lack of signature by a judge on the order joining these appeals and moved for a properly signed order. The appellant's motion was denied, and a judge did not sign the denial.
15. The court complains in its opinion that the pro se appellant failed to strictly follow the rules, specifically Rule 84.0(c). The appellant contends that even if he failed to meet some of the requirements of that rule that he should not be held to a higher standard of technical perfection than judges are held to. This court has failed to uphold Rule 74.01(a) requiring the signature of judges. If judges are allowed to violate the signature rule then the court has certainly waived strict interpretation. In fact, the court has set a precedent for ignoring the rules. If the court isn't bound by the rules, neither is the appellant.
16. The appellant questions the ethics of this court in avoiding a decision on the merits of the validity of unsigned orders of the court when this court is violating the same rules the appellant is complaining about. The appellant therefore contends that this court is unfit to decide this issue.
17. In the action in equity for fraud upon the court, the appellant challenged the judgement under Rule 74.06(d). The opinion of this court erroneously applies the standards for Rule 74.06(b).
18. The fraud case was dismissed presumably for failure to state a claim. Since this is an appeal of the dismissal, the only issue before this court is whether or not a claim was stated under Rule 74.06(d). Thus, the only facts that are required to be in the brief on appeal are the facts that relate to the points on appeal. This case was not tried on the merits, therefore the merits are not at issue. Thus the only facts required are the facts necessary to prove the case was properly plead. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the underlying issues and therefore those facts were not relevant to this case.

This court has no place criticizing the appellant's legal skills when this court fails to follow it's own rules and appears to not be able to grasp the concept of judges signing orders. The very idea that the court ignores the requirement of a judge to sign orders while criticizing the technical form of a pro se litigant's brief causes the appellant to laugh at the courts position. The court, in its opinion, appears to defend an unsigned order by an unknown author. By "appears" what I mean is that the unsigned opinion of the court is a ruling on the issue of order signed by commissioners. This case isn't about commissioners signing orders, but orders that are unsigned. Thus the unsigned opinion fails to address any of the issues presented to the court. The unsigned opinion is so poorly written and confusing that one might conclude that it blesses unsigned orders of the court by unknown authors. Otherwise, this unsigned opinion is little more than legal gibberish at best. Perhaps that is why none of the judges want to sign it.

Deliberate failure of this court to uphold the requirement of signed orders by judges and to protect lawyers from actions for fraud upon the court violate Tile 42 section 1985(2) of the civil rights code. This section states in part, "or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws".

At oral arguments the appellant raised the issue of the respondent's lawyer's fraudulent billing presented to this court. Mr. Sharp, as you can see in his two respondent's briefs, attached a request for attorney's fees that are virtually identical in both cases. The appellant asked the court to rule that if a lawyer is going to present a fraudulent bill to the court, that the lawyer at least be required to make his fraudulent bill believable. The appellant asked the court to note the Cannons of Judicial Conduct with regard to reporting professional misconduct on the part of lawyers practicing law. The appellant notes that the unsigned opinion does not mention Mr. Sharp's request for attorney's fees. The appellant therefore asks this court if it's worth risking a federal civil rights lawsuit against its judges for covering up the criminal conduct of Mr. Sharp? The appellant hereby calls on the court to report Mr. Sharp's attempted fraud to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

The failure of this court to uphold the law and to conceal criminal conduct on the part of lawyers, and to deny the appellant due process of law is treason to the constitution. Decisions like this undermine case law and pollute judicial decisions. Can you imagine other courts actually relying on this unsigned opinion? The conduct of the court is nothing short of bizarre, and decisions like this make for a compelling argument to put an end to judicial self regulation and judicial immunity. It certainly undermines the integrity of the courts and the respect of the people who the courts supposedly serve. This opinion is an act of contempt against the people.

The appellant can not condone or support this courts decision to ignore the law and it's own rules of court. The appellant has a constitutional duty, as a citizen of the United States of America to deny this court in it's attempt to undermine the integrity of the judicial system for either personal gain or the personal gain of unethical lawyers who practice before it. The government exists solely for the purpose of serving the people and the authority of the courts rests solely in its duty to perform judicial services for the people. Conversely, to the extent that the courts become self serving and acts in a manner that is inconsistent with its constitutional duty to perform its function, the court loses its powers and authority.

Ultimate power rests not in the courts, but with the people. The Declaration of Independence is quite clear on the ultimate duty of the people to throw off governments who fail to serve the needs of the people and who disobey the rule of law. The courts have decided to become self regulating which in itself violates the precepts of the "checks and balances" system that was implemented to prevent the courts, the legislature, and the president, from usurping the powers of the King. But when the courts take advantage of the self regulation to act in their own self interests, and the self interests of the Bar, at the expense of the people, then it is the duty of the people, acting as a forth branch of government, to take direct action, under the law, in order to restore the courts to a submissive posture.

This unsigned opinion, in failing to correct an injustice cause by an unsigned order of the court of an unknown author, in conjunction with this courts own refusal to require orders and judgements be signed by Article V judges constitutes an act of treason to the Constitution. This act undermines the full faith and credit clause in that other states are required to uphold and recognize judgements of Missouri courts that can now be challenged in every state on the basis that the Missouri judgement is void for lack of a valid signature. It also undermines the dignity of the court and the respect of the public in that it is obvious to the common person on the street that orders of the court are required to be signed by judges. This opinion fails to pass the "giggle test". The giggle test is when the common person on the street hears this opinion, and the conduct of this court in refusing to sign orders, it causes them to giggle, roll their eyes, and exclaim, "you gotta be kidding me!"

In the spirit of the giggle test, if the appellant has to appeal this opinion to the Missouri Supreme Court, the appellate will send in his request for transfer with an unsigned check for $50. When the court contacts the appellant to point out that his check isn't signed, the appellant will tell the court that the opinion he is appealing isn't signed either and that a pro se appellant shouldn't be held to a higher standard than a judge.

In the case of Elkins Et Al. v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 the United States Supreme Court, speaking about the imperative of judicial integrity stated:

The appellant has an absolute right to due process of law under the 14^th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Due process of law includes the right to have his cause decided, and to have the court issue a judgement that is made lawfully and legally, and will pass constitutional scrutiny. Since judgements that are not sign are not judgements, this court is violating the appellant's right to due process of law.

Since the court's sole purpose is to produce judgements and orders, and since these judgements and orders require the signature of a judge, the refusal of the judges of this court to sign orders and judgement, and to fail to uphold the requirement of a signature by subordinate courts, can not be construed as a judicial act or entitlement of immunity. It is in fact a refusal to do a judicial act, since all judicial acts ultimately require a judge's signature.

The appellant, in his role as a citizen learned in the law, and as an acting officer of the court, hereby rejects the unsigned opinion of the court and demands a properly signed opinion that is consistent with the plain language of the rules and common law. The conduct of this court is outrageous and shocks the conscience. The appellant warns the court that he has the intent, the legal right, and the ability through legal means to enforce the requirements of the constitution upon this court should this court fail to perform its lawful duty. If this court fails to reverse its reckless conduct and continues to obstruct justice, the appellant will demand the resignation of the members of this court and call for replacements by jurists, loyal to the Constitution, who will uphold their oath of office.

In addition, because this opinion affects all Missouri courts, and that all judges have an interest in the outcome of this case, the appellant has emailed a copy of this court's unsigned opinion to 242 Missouri judges to invite them to file amecus briefs, and to urge the judges of this court to comply with the Constitution. Should this opinion be upheld, the appellant will notify, by email, the supreme courts of the other 49 states, 22,000 judges, and 450,000 lawyers, and urge them to question the validity of any Missouri judgement that doesn't comply with Missouri's own signature rules. The appellant believes an argument can be made in every other state that an unsigned appellate decision is not a decision and is not subject to the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. The appellant looks forward to the day when the judges of this court will have to explain to the justices of the United States Supreme Court why they refuse to obey their own rules. If the judges of this court wish to put their reputation and careers on the line to cover up for Mr. Sharp and be his codefendant, then so be it.

Ultimately, this case may serve to become the case that breaks the back of the curse of self regulation and judicial immunity and restore external regulation to the courts as required by the doctrine of checks and balances. It may prove once and for all that the judiciary can not be trusted to regulate itself.

WHEREFORE, appellant asks the court to quit covering up for crooked lawyers, rule according to the law, and to issue a properly signed opinion. Or in the alternative, transfer the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. Furthermore, the appellant petitions this court to find that Mr. Sharp's billing constitutes fraudulent behavior and to report it to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

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Marc Perkel * Appellant * 04-06-00

NOTE TO THE COURT: The appellant will be out of town from April 7^th to April 17^th and asks that the court notify him by email of any decisions it makes during his travels. The appellant's email address is: marc@perkel.com .